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ABSTRACT
Due to the process of globalization and rapid economic evolution in the last several years,
transnational corporations have become extremely powerful. There is an evident disproportion
between the numerous rights enjoyed by transnational corporations and the scarce obligations
undertaken by them. Given their transnational nature, transnational corporations have been
successfully avoiding national regulations of both their home and host states, and they are
seeking to operate in countries with the lowest standards so as to increase their profits. This has
resulted in the violation of basic human rights. Therefore, there is an increasing need for the
creation of international instruments addressed to transnational corporations with express and
clear obligations aimed at the respect of human rights. This study will analyze the nature and
scope, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the most important current instruments
regulating transnational corporate conduct at the international level.
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INTRODUCTION
The present work is divided into five chapters. Chapter I defines the problem of corporate
abuse of power, describes general issues connected to corporate social accountability and
responsibility, and explains why there is an urgent need for effective legal regulation of
transnational corporate conduct. Chapter II deals with NGOs activism and their role in pressuring
transnational corporations (TNCs) to behave in a socially responsible manner. Chapter III
analyzes advantages and disadvantages of voluntary codes of conduct, as a way of ensuring
corporate compliance with certain standards. It also describes some of the most known or the
most successful codes of conduct created in the past.
Chapter IV deals with international instruments regulating transnational corporate
conduct. International instruments are divided into the following four groups: general human
rights instruments addressed particularly to states; specific international instruments directed to
only some kinds of TNCs and focusing on a very narrow area of corporate standards;
international instruments aimed at regulation of a broader area of corporate standards (labor
standards, environmental standards, consumer protection, or bribery); and international
instruments addressed directly to TNCs (not only to governments) and covering a broad scope of
standards related to transnational corporate conduct.
Chapter V then describes and analyzes in further detail two crucial international
instruments regulating transnational corporate conduct: OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, and the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.

2

Finally, the conclusion of this work focuses on the imperfections of all present available
instruments regulating transnational corporate conduct and suggests possible solutions to the
problem.
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CHAPTER I
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. Defining Transnational Corporation
“Transnational corporation,” also called “multinational corporation” or “multinational
enterprise,” is defined by the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and other Business Enterprises as:
“[A]n economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of
economic entities operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form,
whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken
individually or collectively.”1
Another definition of TNC is contained in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises:
“These usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one
country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways.
While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence
over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may
vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be
private, state or mixed.”2
From the above definitions, it is possible to derive certain typical features of TNC:
•

An entity having legal status;

•

Its motive is to gain profit;

•

It performs economic activities in more than one country;

1

Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 22d mtg., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003)
[hereinafter Norms].
2
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD (Revision 2000), Part I.3, available at
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf> [hereinafter OECD 2000 Guidelines].
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•

It consists of more entities that are related to each other.3

B. Structure of Transnational Corporations
A transnational corporation consists of a parent company and its foreign affiliates.4 These
foreign affiliates can be of two different types depending on their legal status – an incorporated
subsidiary or an unincorporated branch.5 A subsidiary is incorporated under the local law of a
host country as a separate legal entity and thus, a parent company is generally not accountable
for its conduct.6 The parent company is liable only up to the amount of capital that it has invested
in the subsidiary.7 However, such limited liability does not have to be always applied since, in
some cases, it is possible to “pierce the corporate veil”, and thus, to hold a parent company liable
for conduct of its subsidiary.8
A parent company controls its subsidiaries through ownership of the whole subsidiary or
its significant part, or through other contractual measures.9 These other contractual measures
include the following forms of control: (1) a parent company keeps an exclusive right to manage
and offer technical services to its subsidiary for a certain fee; (2) a parent company keeps an
exclusive right to occupy certain positions in the management of its subsidiary, such as the
managing director; or (3) a parent company keeps the right of veto, by which it ensures that
certain decisions cannot be taken without its approval.10 These measures enable TNCs to keep

3

See, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International
Law: An Introduction, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-4 (Menno
T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
4
See DETLEV F. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 184, 415 (3d ed. 2003).
5
Id.
6
See Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability of Polycorporate Enterprises, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197, 203 (1999).
7
See John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aquilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction over Corporate
Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U.L. REV. 445, 446 (2004).
8
See generally Swain & Aquilar, supra note 7.
9
See P. EBOW BONDZI-SIMPSON, LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HOST
STATES 138-39 (1990).
10
Id.
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control over their subsidiaries even in situations when a host state or one of its nationals possess
majority shares in the company.11
In the contrast to a subsidiary, a branch does not function as a separate legal entity;
rather, it is a permanently established office in a foreign country, which is entirely owned by a
parent company.12 A parent company is therefore legally liable for its conduct.
TNCs usually consist of one parent company and its subsidiaries so that their organizational
structure resembles a pyramid.13 On the top there is a parent company that controls its wholly or
partially owned subsidiaries that may further control their own partially or wholly owned
subsidiaries.14 In addition, some TNCs consist of two parent companies (e.g. Unilever or Royal
Dutch Shell) and as such they are controlled from two countries.15
C. Corporate Social Responsibility v. Corporate Social Accountability
Corporate social responsibility is used in connection with voluntary acts of a corporation
that are undertaken to implement certain labor, environmental and other human rights
standards.16 In other words, a TNC is socially responsible whenever its ethical conduct is
voluntary and is not required by any legal norms or other regulations. Corporate voluntary codes
of conduct are a typical example of performing corporate social responsibility.
In contrast, corporate social accountability is used in connection with binding
government regulations that are imposed on corporate conduct in the area of human rights and

11

Id.
See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 4, at 184, 415.
13
Id. at 201.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social
and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 175-76 (2004); Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, Global
Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic Perspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM U. INT’L L.
REV. 1265, 1270-72 (2004).
12
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other standards.17 Simply said, corporate social accountability means that a TNC is exposed to
certain binding legal norms, which it is obliged to follow without regard to its desire.
In the title of this comment, the term “accountability” is intentionally used instead of the
term “responsibility” since emphasis should be put on corporate social accountability in order to
ensure compliance of all TNCs with certain minimum human rights and other standards.
D. Protection of Transnational Corporate Rights
When discussing the duties of TNCs it is also important to mention the protection of their
rights. Transnational corporate rights are specifically protected by bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), which are used by countries (especially the least developed ones) as typical instruments
to attract foreign direct investment.18 These agreements are designed to protect foreign direct
investment and usually include basic principles of corporate treatment, such as fair and equitable
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and national treatment, and establish dispute settlement
mechanisms.19 They also often prohibit nationalization or expropriation of corporate property
without just compensation.20 The amount of BITs has grown rapidly in the last years as it moved
from the number of 385 in 1989 to the number of 2,265 in 2003 covering 176 countries.21

17

See sources cited supra note 16.
See The Robinson Rojas Archive, Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social Development?,
Part 2: Rights and Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, at <http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/op05-05.htm>
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social
Development?]; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Instruments Online, What Are
BITs?, at <http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx> (last visited May 2, 2005) [hereinafter What
Are BITs?].
19
See sources cited supra note 18.
20
Id.
21
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Quantitative data on bilateral investment treaties and
double taxation treaties, at <http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1> (last visited
May 2, 2005).
18
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Transnational corporate rights are also protected under the WTO system and its complex
set of agreements.22 The WTO/GATT system is focused on the creation of a global economic
system that would minimize trade barriers imposed by national governments.23 Since TNCs act
as the main participants in international trade, either as importers or exporters, they are the ones
that benefit from such a system. Moreover, certain agreements under the WTO protect corporate
rights directly. For instance, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures
(TRIMs) prohibits investment measures that would distort or restrict trade;24 and the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) provides protection to
trademarks, patents, etc., which are owned by TNCs.25 Additionally, some TNCs benefit in a
similar way from other preferential agreements, like the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)26 or the European Community Treaty,27 which create free trade areas.28
Furthermore, recent economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, Latin America
and Southeast Asia, accompanied by privatization efforts, provided TNCs with the opportunity to

22

See, e.g., Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social Development?, supra note 18; James
A. Paul & Jason Garred, Making Corporations Accountable, A Background Paper for the United Nations Financing
for Development Process, Global Policy Forum, Dec. 2000, available at
<http://globalpolicy.igc.org/socecon/ffd/2000papr.htm>.
23
See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.; JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 208-11 (4th ed. 2002);
World Trade Organization, at <http://www.wto.org/> (last visited May 2, 2005).
24
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the WTO Organization, Annex 1A - Item 14, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994).
25
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO Organization, Annex 1A - Item 14, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); see also Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social
Development?, supra note 18.
26
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA deals with protection of foreign investment made by one contracting party in a country
of another contracting party. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. 107 Stat. 2057
(1994), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
27
Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, O.J. (C 191) (1993).
28
See Paul & Garred, supra note 22.

8

expand their field of influence and increase their market access to these regions and therefore, to
enhance their power worldwide.29
As described above, the current international economic and political situation is pushing
to enforce and protect transnational corporate rights at a global level.30 This well-established
international protection of corporate rights is in absolute disproportion with the level of
international binding regulations imposed on TNCs.31 Therefore, the focus of this comment is
aimed at the creation and enforcement of corporate obligations in a global dimension that would
ensure fair balance between those obligations and their correlative rights.
E. The Increasing Power of Transnational Corporations
Due to the process of globalization and rapid economic evolution in the last several years,
TNCs have become extremely powerful. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report
2004 there are currently at least 61,000 TNCs worldwide with over 900,000 foreign affiliates.32
TNCs account for 70% of total international trade and their annual earnings are higher than the
GDP of many countries.33 In fact, 51 of the 100 world’s largest economies are TNCs, and only
49 are countries.34
In general, TNCs tend to establish manufacturing subsidiaries in countries with low labor
and environmental standards, particularly in developing nations. This represents an advantage to
them, in comparison to the contrasting high standards generally existing in their home

29

See Transnational Corporations: Impediments or Catalysts of Social Development?, supra note 18.
Id.
31
Id.
32
UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2004), 38-39, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2004_en.pdf>.
33
UNCTAD, Multinational Corporations in Least Developed Countries, at
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2002/modelun.pdf> (last visited July 2, 2005) [hereinafter MNCs in Least
Developed Countries].
34
Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power, Corporate Watch, at
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/top200.htm> (last visited July 2, 2005).
30
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countries.35 Due to their high mobility, TNCs can easily move their capital and affiliates out of
host countries that impose stricter and less convenient legal regulations on their business
conduct.36 Such loss of foreign investment would have serious consequences for a developing
country.37 Consequently, the governments of these countries might prefer lowering regulations
imposed on corporate conduct rather than increasing them, so as not to lose the corporate
businesses’ investments.38
F. Main Violations and Abuses by Transnational Corporations
Given their increasing power and their transnational character, TNCs or their contractors
and sub-contractors can easily violate non-efficient legal regulations or take advantage of low
legal standards in their host states in order to gain profit.39 The main transnational corporate
violations can be found in four main grounds: (1) violation of labor standards; (2) violation of
environmental standards; (3) violation of consumers’ rights; and (4) bribing of governmental
officials.
1. Violation of Labor Rights
TNCs operating in developing countries are legally allowed to pay their employees very
low wages (around 25 cents per hour) and they are often not legally obligated to pay a higher

35

See, e.g., Paul & Garred, supra note 22.
See, e.g., Jamie Cassels, Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and Catastrophic Law, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 311, 313
(2001); MNCs in Least Developed Countries, supra note 33; Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes
of Conduct and the American Multinational Enterprise, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 89, 94-95 (2001); Ryan P. Toftoy, Now
Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater. Is Nike Just Doing It?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
905, 906 (1998).
37
See sources cited supra note 36.
38
Id.
39
See, e.g., Sarah Joseph, An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises, in
LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman
Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000); Paul & Garred, supra note 22.
36
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wage rate for overtime.40 For example, average Nike employees in Vietnam work for $1.60 a day
making shoes that are sold for $180 a pair.41 Corporations also often buy cheap raw materials
from suppliers that do not comply with labor standards. Even though this constitutes an indirect
violation, it also has to be considered and avoided by TNCs.42
The most serious violations of labor standards consist of child labor,43 forced labor, poor
and unhealthy working conditions,44 insufficient safety regulations,45 payment of wages under a
legal minimum level, discrimination.46 Some important TNCs, such as Nike and Gap, have

40

See, e.g., S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS, GUIDELINES FOR CREATING CODES OF CONDUCT IN
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 58-59 (2003); MNCs in Least Developed Countries, supra note 33.
41
See Jim Hightower, Nike just does it to Vietnamese Workers – Torture, Abuse, ALBION MONITOR, May 3, 1997,
available at <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9704b/jh-nikeabuse.html> (last visited July 5, 2005).
42
On June 10, 2004, Human Rights Watch called on Coca-Cola to stop using sugar from El Salvador because of
child labor. See Human Rights Watch, El Salvador: Hazardous Child Labor on Sugar Plantations, available at
<http://www.hrw.org/children/labor/elsalvador> (last visited July 5, 2005).
43
The India Committee of the Netherlands, in cooperation with its partners in Europe and India, and the
International Labor Rights Fund, released a new report saying that “an estimated 12,375 children continue to work
under terrible conditions on cottonseed farms” in southern India. The report mentions Bayer, Monsanto, Avanta and
Emergent Genetics as some of the TNC’s benefiting from these farms, where children work 12 to 14 hours a day and
earn around 50 cents a day. Suhasini, Multinational Corporations Reap Profits from Child Labor in India’s
Cottonseed Farms, ONE WORLD SOUTH ASIA, October 6, 2004, available at
http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/95471/1/> (last visited July 5, 2005).
44
A good example can be found in the banana industry. Shell Chemical Co. and Dow Chemical have been selling
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) as a pesticide to banana producers such as Dole Food Co., Chiquita Brands
International Inc. and Fresh del Monte Produce Co. DBCP was banned in the U.S. in 1979 due to its sterility effects
on males when inhaled or absorbed by the skin, but these TNC’s are still using it in Central American banana
plantations, causing serious health damages among the banana workers. See Stephen Leahy, Workers Left Sterile by
Pesticide Seek Justice, TIERRAMERICA, November 12, 2004, available at
<http://www.tierramerica.net/2004/1106/iacentos.shtml> (last visited July 5, 2005).
45
Coca-Cola was accused of lack of security for its workers, after a number of labor organizers were murdered at
bottling plants in Colombia. The TNC admitted that its bottling plants needed increased security. See Maxine Frith,
The Ethical Revolution Sweeping through the World’s Sweatshops, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), April 16, 2005, at
News-20. A lack of safety standards was also experienced in the Bhopal disaster (1984), where a Union Carbide
subsidiary was held responsible for a gas leak in one of its factories, causing an explosion that killed thousands of
people and is still the cause of many chronic illnesses. See Justin Huggler, Bhopal 20 Years On: Polluted Water,
Chronic Illness and Little Compensation, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), November 29, 2004, at Foreign News-24.
46
See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 39, at 76; Centre Europe – Tiers Monde, Will the UN compel transnational
corporations to comply with international human rights standards? 3 (2002), available at
<http://www.aaj.org.br/artigos/02stn1_en.pdf> (last visited July 5, 2005).
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recently admitted that workers were exploited in some of their factories, and they are now trying
to take the proper measures to correct their conduct and clean up their public image.47
2. Violation of environmental standards
TNC’s often abuse the lack of environmental protection regulation in developing nations.
These violations are often associated to oil companies. Two good examples are Engen in South
Africa, which has been polluting the air for years producing asthma in children,48 and also the
highly criticized British Petroleum, which is one of the major polluters of the globe.49
3. Violation of consumer rights
These violations occur when TNC’s sell harmful products or provide incorrect
information.

The most relevant example is the wave of genetically modified organisms

(“GMOs”) now circulating around the world. The main beneficiaries of this technology are U.S.based companies (e.g., Monsanto and Syngenta), who are trying to convince the world that
GMOs are the best option to solve the problem of hunger, even when nobody is currently sure of
their effect on human health.50 Consumers have the right to be informed about the consequences

47

“Nike” recently disclosed that a quarter of its factories were not meeting minimum standards, and pledged to
ensure that its codes of conduct on pay, hours and conditions are complied with form now on. “Gap” also published
a report revealing terrible working conditions (child labor, working weeks of over 80 hours, etc.) in its factories in
Mexico, China, Russia, and India, and therefore, it decided to cancel contracts with 136 factories. See Frith, supra
note 45.
48
A medical study carried out in 2002 by Durban’s Nelson Mandela School of Medicine and a U.S. university,
found that an abnormally high 52% of students and teachers at a primary school bordering the Engen plant suffered
from asthma. It found that increases in air pollution tended to aggravate asthma symptoms in children. Grant Clark,
Durban’s Poor Fight For Clean Air, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, December 14,
2004.
49
British Petroleum is the world’s third largest oil and gas company. It is in charge of the 1,100-mile long oil
pipeline running from Azerbaijan down to the Turkish seaport of Ceyhan. The project has taken local people’s lands
illegally, it has damaged local roads, drainage and irrigation systems, and it has polluted the water. See Hannah Ellis,
The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline: BP’s Time Bomb, CORPWATCH, June 2, 2005, available at
<http://corpwatch.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=12340> (last visited July 5, 2005).
50
“The critical forces behind the development of the technology itself are just five companies – Dow, DuPont,
Syngenta, Aventis and Monsanto – which control three out of every four patents issued over the past ten years for
genetically modified crops.” Mark Schapiro, Sowing Disaster?, THE NATION, Oct. 10, 2002. “Despite claims from
the biotech industry, GM foods cannot end world hunger, and new studies add to the evidence that they may pose a
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of eating genetically modified foodstuffs (i.e., through proper labeling), especially when there
are professional studies carried out by TNCs themselves about this potentially-threatening
issue.51
4. Bribing of governmental officials
It is common for national or municipal governments to grant concessions over natural
resources in favor of TNC’s that are capable of paying high sums of money in return. For
example, the residents of Cochamba, Bolivia found that their water system was under control of
a multinational consortium headed by the giant Bechtel. The consortium’s name was “Aguas del
Tunari,” and due to acts of corruption, it was granted a 40-year concession to run Cochamba’s
water system, as well as many other privileges. This represented huge profits for the consortium
and high water prices for the citizens.52 Another case is taking place in the area where the BakuCeyhan Pipeline is being constructed by British Petroleum. This TNC has been accused of
bribing officials in order to occupy lands not formally sold.53
TNC’s are often accused of facilitating corruption and provoking instability.54 This is
most common in Africa, where U.S. oil companies (assisted by western banks) paid bribes to the
Nigerian government to let them drain out the country’s oil resources; Chinese companies armed
serious threat to human health.” Kirsten Schwind and Hoollace Poole-Kavana, We Need GM Food Like a Hole in
Our Kidneys, COMMON DREAMS, June 21, 2005, available at <http://www.commondreams.org/views05/062133.htm> (last visited July 5, 2005).
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military rulers and built pipelines in Sudan and Chad; and French companies encouraged the
Congolese government to engage in huge debts as part of an “African Strategy,” which has now
turned into huge debts for local oil producers.55
G. Conclusions
It is apparent that corporate compliance with minimum local legal requirements is no
longer sufficient.56 TNCs operate with enormous power that is not accompanied by effective
legal control.57 There is a clear disproportion between the numerous rights possessed by TNCs,
and the few obligations imposed on them.58 Therefore, there is an urgent need for the creation of
certain binding standards with an effective enforcement mechanism. This mechanism would
ensure corporate compliance with minimum human rights and other standards protecting host
countries with inefficient or non-existent local legal regulations of corporate conduct from
corporate abuse. Most importantly, these standards must be created on an international level so
as to hinder the capability of transnational corporations to avoid national regulations.59
However, while there have been attempts to balance transnational corporate rights and
obligations, it remains a complicated issue since international rules concerning transnational
corporate liability have been incorporated only in codes of conduct or guidelines bearing a form
of voluntary regulations, also called “soft law.”60 Although the issuance of such codes or
guidelines is a good step forward, these instruments are lacking effective enforcement
mechanisms through which corporate compliance could be realized.
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CHAPTER II
NGO PRESSURE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. Definition and Types of NGOs
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their various pressures on TNCs represent
one of the most efficient currently available means of forcing TNCs to become socially
responsible.61 However, despite the positive role of NGOs involvement and the good results of
their attempts, NGO activism should serve only as an additional instrument in regulating
corporate conduct, and not as an exclusive one.
NGOs can be defined as:
“[P]rivate organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the
interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or
undertake community development. In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied
to any non-profit organization which is independent from government. NGOs are
typically value-based organizations which depend, in whole or in part, on
charitable donations and voluntary service. Although the NGO sector has become
increasingly professionalized over the last two decades, principles of altruism and
voluntarism remain key defining characteristics.”62
There is a high number of NGOs working in different areas, which are not always related
to corporate responsibility, such as family/women issues, religions, services, etc.63 The NGOs
that include corporate responsibility projects on their agenda usually work in a certain specific
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area, such as civil/human rights, environment, consumer interests, or corruption.64 Some NGOs
focus exclusively on corporate responsibility projects; others include corporate responsibility
projects on their agenda, as well as other unrelated projects from different areas. Following are
some examples of NGOs focusing wholly on corporate responsibility projects:
1. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)
ICCR concentrates entirely on work with corporations in various areas, including access
to health care (prescription drugs access, pharmaceutical lobbying, fraud), business supply chains
(sweatshops, human rights abuses, wage inequalities, unfair labor practices), corporate
governance (independency and transparency of boards of directors), environment (pollution,
applicable laws and regulations), global warming, promoting human rights (TNCs operating in
countries with repressive governments, corporate codes of conduct, forced/compulsory/child
labor, worker health and safety), water and food (the health risks of genetically modified food,
the scarcity of water resources).65
2. International Center for Corporate Accountability (ICCA)
ICCA is a non-profit organization aimed at promotion of good corporate citizenship. Its
mission is to encourage TNCs in creating voluntary codes of conduct that would guide their
business conduct in host countries regarding protection of human and labor rights.66 Most
importantly, ICCA provides independent monitoring of TNCs aimed at ensuring their
compliance with corporate codes of conduct.67
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3. Transparency International
Transparency International concentrates its entire agenda on corporations. Its work is
devoted to only one aspect of corporate accountability – combating corruption, which includes
raising awareness about corruption and monitoring.68
4. Consumers International
Consumers International consists of many independent consumer organizations and its
work focuses on another area of corporate accountability – consumers.69 Its projects include
consumer health and safety, consumer education, corporate responsibility, and consumer
protection.70
5. Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC)
CCC is an organization aimed at improving working conditions in the global garment
industry in order to end exploitation and abuse of workers in this industry.71 Its work includes
pressuring companies to take responsibility for ensuring that their products are produced in
decent working conditions; supporting workers, trade unions and NGOs in producer countries;
and raising awareness among consumers about working conditions in the garment industry.72
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6. Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF)
IBLF is a non-profit organization based in Great Britain aimed at the promotion of
business activities in the field of corporate social responsibility and supporting sustainable socioeconomic development in local communities.73
B. NGO Pressure Techniques
NGO techniques of pressuring TNCs include a wide range tools, such as the
dissemination of information about human rights violations to the public, the cooperation with
other NGOs and other entities at the international level, the reporting and consultations with
governments and intergovernmental organizations on human rights problems.74 Other NGO
pressure techniques include traditional tools of protest, such as boycotts and street
demonstrations, as well as newly developed tools, including networking or “buying company
shares and pressing for shareholder resolutions.”75 NGOs are also active in international
litigation intervening in cases as parties, court or party-appointed experts, witnesses or amici
curiae.76 Furthermore, in recent years, NGOs have extended their access to intergovernmental
organizations.77 For instance, the UN has increased the number of NGOs involved in their
work.78 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Rights
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of Child, and the Committee against Torture allow NGOs to formally intervene on human rights
issues.79
The strongest instrument available to NGOs is to shame corporations violating
international standards in public. Creating pressure by negative publicity often causes a decrease
in consumer interest as well as difficulty with hiring high quality employees.80 NGO activism
has reached a significant number of positive results leading to changes in transnational corporate
business conduct. For example Nike, as a response to negative publicity, improved working
conditions in its factories located in Asia;81 Whirlpool Corp., influenced by Greenpeace, started
to use environmentally friendly insulation;82 and Home Depot stopped buying lumber from
Canada’s Great Bear rain forest.83
Another possible and newly developed tool used by NGOs in order to influence corporate
conduct is direct cooperation between NGOs and TNCs.84 Such cooperation can be carried out
on different levels and in different intensity, varying from a company’s simple donation to
support a certain project, to a true long-term partnership.85 Some examples of this type of
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cooperation can be found in Fair Labor Association,86 Global Alliance,87 or Pact and
International Business Leaders Forum.88 Nevertheless, this approach brings certain dangers to
both sides: NGOs risk their good reputation and may waste their limited resources in an
unsuccessful partnership; and companies risk wasting time and financial resources, as well as
misuse of sensitive information.89 Despite the possible risks, such partnership can also bring
positive results: (1) a company can gain credibility and improve its reputation; (2) it can also
benefit from the NGO’s knowledge and expertise; (3) there are also monetary benefits for NGOs;
(4) such partnership provides NGOs with an opportunity to make a substantial positive change in
corporate business conduct; and therefore, to become more useful and relevant.90
C. Conclusions
Despite their numerous positive results, NGOs activism is limited and has not proven to
be always effective. NGOs have to rely on corporate willingness to cooperate. In case
corporations are not willing to cooperate, the most effective instrument available to NGOs is
negative publicity, which does not always work.91 Sometimes, even consumer boycotts do not
lessen corporate huge worldwide profits.92 For instance, Nestlé keeps making huge profits even
despite the long-term negative campaigns against that company for its improper marketing of
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baby milk formula in developing countries, which contributes to high infant mortality there.93
Another example is a failure of NGO activists to persuade Wal-Mart Stores Inc. to open its
supplier factories to public scrutiny and to monitoring by independent auditors.94
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CHAPTER III
PRIVATE CODES OF CONDUCT
A. General Considerations
TNCs are beginning to adopt their own voluntary sets of labor, environmental and human
rights standards that seek to regulate their business conduct.95 These codes have become popular
among corporations for several reasons. Firstly, codes provide corporations with a convenient
possibility of assuring their stakeholders and the public in general that their business is
conducted in an ethical and socially responsible fashion.96 Moreover, proponents of voluntary
codes of conduct argue that there is no need for external corporate regulation by governments,
since labor, environmental and other human rights standards can be secured by corporations
themselves.97 They also argue that codes of conduct are a more adaptable and less expensive way
of regulation since no monitoring institutions need to be established.98
Unfortunately, voluntary codes of conduct suffer from many imperfections.99 Such codes
usually include only vague statements, lack transparency and an effective enforcement
mechanism.100 Companies are not willing to be exposed to independent external monitoring
procedures that would ensure their compliance to the codes.101 Because of their voluntary
character, there is no guarantee that the codes will always be followed in practice.102
Additionally, companies usually implement codes of conduct only under public pressure to make
95
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an impression of a socially responsible business.103 Also, restrictions are imposed only on the
corporations that adopt a voluntary code of conduct and put it into practice.104 Therefore, these
corporations might assume that they place themselves at a competitive disadvantage in
comparison to other corporations that do not adopt their own corporate codes of conduct.105 To
eliminate the most obvious disadvantages, companies sometimes perform monitoring procedures
by third parties like public accounting firms (for instance Ernst and Young, or
PricewaterhouseCoopers).106 Unfortunately, the monitoring that is performed by these firms does
not prove to be very efficient either, since audit reports usually do not have to be published.
Also, there is a possibility that the monitoring firms might not be strict enough because of
dealing with corporations that are their permanent clients, and therefore their significant financial
source.107 Thus, the more efficient alternative way is to involve NGOs in monitoring
procedures.108
B. Types of Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct can be generally divided into two groups – public and private codes of
conduct.109 Public codes of conduct are those created by inter-governmental organizations, such
as the UN, the OECD and the ILO.110 Private codes of conduct can be further divided into
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multistakeholder codes of conduct and individual codes of conduct.111 Multistakeholder codes of
conduct are created either by a number of companies in a certain region or industry, or in
cooperation with non-governmental or trade union organizations and companies.112 This type of
corporate codes is then applied by a whole group of corporations that participated on its
creation.113 The second type of private codes is created and applied by individual companies.114
Companies usually prefer the multistakeholder approach since it provides them with the
possibility of hiding among the others when dealing with the code’s implementation and their
possible critics.115 Individual codes of conduct are used if the multistakeholder approach does not
prove to be successful.116 Unfortunately, multistakeholder codes of conduct appear to be even
less efficient than individual codes of conduct for several reasons.117 Firstly, to succeed, they
need to be adopted by as large number of companies as possible.118 This might bring difficulties
in decision-making procedures since a consensus of all companies is required.119 Also, it is hard
to force a large number of companies to follow particular standards.120 If only a small number of
them fail to comply with a particular code of conduct, it might cause a failure of such corporate
code for all the companies involved.121 And most importantly, multistakeholder codes of conduct
suffer from the so called “free rider problem”.122 Individual companies are usually not interested
in improving certain standards of their business conduct since there are no enforcement
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procedures available to ensure companies’ compliance with their obligations.123 Thus, companies
often participate on such multistakeholder codes of conduct only to make a public impression of
a socially responsible corporation, without having any real intention to improve their business
performance.124
C. Some Examples of Codes of Conduct
To demonstrate their character, advantages and disadvantages, following are some
examples of the most known voluntary codes of conduct:
1. The Sullivan Principles in South Africa (Multistakeholder Code of Conduct)125
The Sullivan Principles (The Principles) serve as one of the best and most successful
examples of an international code of conduct.126 They were proposed by Reverend Leon Sullivan
in 1977, and were accepted by twelve major U.S. TNCs that agreed to apply the Principles to
their business operations in South Africa.127 The Principles were aimed against the apartheid
legally practiced in South Africa and were supposed to improve working and living conditions
for black employees.128 The signatory companies reached success in removing apartheid from
their operations.129 They also increased wages for black workers and played an important role in
improving their living conditions.130
However, the companies did not make satisfactory progress in increasing the number of
black workers in management and supervisory positions, nor did they succeed in supporting
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black business development.131 In the end, most of the U.S. companies, when faced with constant
public critics, decided to withdraw their economic activities from South Africa.132
2. The Fair Labor Association’s Workplace Code of Conduct (Multistakeholder Code of
Conduct) 133
The Fair Labor Association (“FLA”) emerged from the Apparel Industry Partnership,
which was established in 1996, to deal with public criticism about violations of labor standards
by suppliers of U.S. corporations in plants in Latin America and Asia.134 The FLA functions as a
nonprofit organization that currently consists of 12 major U.S. apparel and footwear
manufacturers and retailers, and also includes participation of other companies, NGOs,
universities and colleges.135 The essential task of the FLA is to promote labor rights in factories
in the U.S. and abroad.136 To achieve this task the FLA created a code of conduct and a
monitoring system.137 The Workplace Code of Conduct includes nine principles in the area of
labor rights – prohibition of forced and child labor, protection against harassment and
discrimination, declaration of safe and healthy environment, freedom of association and
collective bargaining, establishment of minimum wages, maximum working hours per week and
overtime compensation.138 As to the monitoring system, the FLA accredits independent monitors
to perform inspections in factories of its participating companies, then the monitors issue public
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reports stating whether these companies’ business operations are in compliance with the
established principles.139 Beside the external monitoring system, companies are also obliged to
perform internal monitoring to ensure their compliance with the code principles.140
Unfortunately, the FLA code also has many disadvantages. The most important flaw is
that every decision made by the FLA has to be approved by all members. Thus, it is always a
question of making political compromises and lowering the level of standards, so that all
members, especially corporations, would consent.141 The code contains broad statements and
does not include specific factors that would determine whether corporations are in compliance
with the declared principles.142 Moreover, in case a company fails to comply with the FLA
principles, the FLA operates with few inefficient enforcement methods.143 A company can be
placed under special review for a 90-day period that can be extended for an indefinite period.144
Also, there is no obligation of making these actions public.145 In the end, if a company does not
comply, its participation can be terminated.146 However, such termination requires a
supermajority vote (at least two thirds of all the industry board members and two thirds of the
labor/NGO board members), which is very hard to reach.147 Under these circumstances, it is not
probable that a company would be exposed to negative publicity.148
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3. Mattel, Inc.: Global Manufacturing Principles (Individual Code of Conduct)149
Mattel, Inc., the world’s largest toy company, created the first version of its code of
conduct for Mattel’s plants and plants of its contract suppliers (called Global Manufacturing
Principles – GMP) in 1997, partly as a response to external NGO criticism.150 Mattel, Inc.
announced that its compliance with GMP would be monitored by an external independent group
(Mattel Independent Monitoring Council – MIMCO) that would be performing audits on a
regular basis with the authority of making its findings public and most importantly, without prior
approval of the company.151
The monitoring procedure is aimed to ensure GMP compliance functions on two separate
levels.152 One level is an internal monitoring by the company itself that is responsible for regular
audits of all Mattel owned or Mattel controlled plants, as well as in its suppliers’ plants.153
Another level of the monitoring system is external monitoring that is performed by an
independent external group of monitors called International Center for Corporate Accountability
(ICCA) (a successor of MIMCO) that performs audits every three years in Mattel’s owned or
Mattel’s controlled plants. In case of Mattel suppliers’ plants, it is up to ICCA’s sole discretion
to decide when and which individual plants will be monitored.154 ICCA audits are aimed at
verification of Mattel’s compliance with GMP and thus, ICCA does not have to monitor each
individual plant.155 By this way of monitoring, it is ensured that ICCA is not overwhelmed by
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more work than it could handle and at the same time, an efficiency of the monitoring system is
guaranteed since each single plant is put under equal pressure that it might be chosen for an
ICCA verification audit.156
By undertaking all these steps, Mattel, Inc. proved that it has taken its social
responsibility and its compliance with GMP seriously. The GMP and its monitoring system have
brought very good results and could serve as a model example of private voluntary corporate
codes of conduct.157
D. Conclusions – Recommendations
As discussed above, private codes of conduct have proved in most cases to be inefficient
and insufficient in obliging TNCs to adhere to certain human rights standards.158 Therefore, it is
apparent that these codes do not play an essential role in the regulation of transnational corporate
conduct. However, as there are currently no binding rules regulating corporate social
accountability on the international level, the voluntary codes of conduct should serve as a
temporary instrument in the process of moving from corporate social responsibility to corporate
social accountability.159 As such, private corporate codes should not be used as an empty gesture
only to satisfy external public pressures, but they should be made as efficient as possible by
meeting the following minimum criteria:
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1. Creation
•

Codes of conduct should be created through the cooperation of companies with NGOs,
trade unions and other stakeholders;160

2. Content
•

Content must be clear and enforcement must be guaranteed;161

•

Labor and environmental standards should be guaranteed on a higher level than are
guaranteed by local legal regulations since the laws in developing countries usually cover
only very low level of these standards;162

•

TNCs should not promise more than they are able to carry out since that could seriously
harm their reputation;163

3. Publicity
All employees should become familiar with their company’s code of conduct and their rights
resulting from this code;
4. Compliance
•

Corporate compliance with a code of conduct must be monitored by an independent
group of experts, including members of NGOs;164

•

Monitoring must be performed on a regular basis and in a transparent way, audit results
must be available to public without company’s prior consent;165

160

See Paul & Garred, supra note 22.
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See SETHI, supra note 40, at 287.
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5. Enforcement
•

In cases of corporate non-compliance with its code of conduct, there must be efficient
sanctions available to ensure the company’s interest in an effective code
implementation;166

•

A complaint procedure should be available to company employees in cases when their
rights guaranteed by a company code of conduct are violated.

166

See Paul & Garred, supra note 22.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS REGULATING
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. UN Instruments on Protection of Human Rights Aimed at States
Certain actions constitute violations of international law and are prohibited by customary
international law binding on all - states and private individuals, including TNCs - without regard
to state consent.167 Such violations include for instance genocide, torture, and slavery.168 The
international instruments that prohibit these crucial human rights obligations are usually
addressed preferably to states as the contracting parties.169 However, private individuals,
including TNCs, are also obliged to comply with such instruments.170
Some international instruments clarify the obligation of private individuals to comply
with the expressed human rights norms by directly referring to them.171 For example, the
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “every individual and every
organ of society” shall promote and secure the rights and freedoms included in this
Declaration.172 Thus, also TNCs, as organs of society, shall ensure compliance with these
rights.173 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights both refer in their preambles to the
obligations of private individuals by including the following sentence: “Realizing that the
167
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individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under
a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.”174 Also, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
states that: “persons committing genocide shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”175
The most important UN human rights instruments that apply also to TNCs despite the
fact they are addressed to states are as follows:
•

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 176

•

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 177

•

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 178

•

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 179

•

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 180

•

The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment 181
However, these instruments have not been able to ensure corporate compliance with

certain standards for several reasons.182 Obligations are imposed on the states parties and not
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directly on TNCs; and therefore, they do not provide an effective controlling and enforcing
mechanism addressed to TNCs.183 The implementation of the obligations depends on the ability
of states to control TNCs, which is not always easy, in view of the growing powers of TNCs.184
Moreover, these instruments do not cover a whole set of standards that need to be applied on
transnational corporate conduct; on the contrary, they include only particular obligations
concerning human rights, which are not sufficient to regulate corporate conduct in all necessary
aspects.
B. International Instruments Covering a Narrow Scope of Obligations and Regulating
Specific Types of Transnational Corporations
These are the most specific instruments regulating transnational corporate conduct. Such
instruments cover a limited field of standards that shall be carried out by corporations that do
business in the particular field of regulation.
An example of such an instrument is the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, which seeks to regulate the tobacco industry in order to protect human health and to
prevent negative social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and
exposure to tobacco smoke.185 States, as the contracting parties to the Convention, are
responsible for the implementation of the document.186 Thus, tobacco manufacturers, distributors
and importers are regulated indirectly by the Convention since the states parties commend
themselves to undertake appropriate legislative and other measures affecting tobacco products at
the national level.187
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Another example of this type of instrument is the WHO International Code of Marketing
of Breast-Milk Substitutes (The Infant Formula Code), which is a set of recommendations to the
WHO member states that promotes and encourages breastfeeding and proper use of breast-milk
substitutes in order to ensure safe and adequate nutrition for infants.188 The Code also calls upon
the manufacturers and distributors of breast-milk substitutes to ensure that their business conduct
is in compliance with the Code.189
These instruments are certainly of essential importance in the particular fields of
business that they seek to regulate. However, they do not cover a comprehensive list of standards
regulating transnational corporate conduct; on the contrary, they focus on very narrow fields of
obligations including only specific areas of business. They also impose obligations only on
contracting states in order to reach the objectives of a particular document. Thus, the
implementation of such an instruments depends on the efficiency of the states’ legal mechanisms
and on their ability to regulate powerful TNCs, which can be sometimes problematic, especially
in the case of developing countries.190 Additionally, some of these instruments, like The Infant
Formula Code mentioned above, represent only a set of recommendations, which are not legally
enforceable and in fact depend on the willingness of the particular parties to comply with them.
C. International Instruments Covering a Narrow Scope of Obligations and Regulating All
Types of Transnational Corporations
These instruments are of a more general character than the previous group of instruments
since they are aimed at regulating all types of TNCs and not only particular types of them.
188

International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, World Health Assembly Res., WHA34/1981/REC/1
(May 21, 1981).
189
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190
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However, this group of instruments has a specific character since they focus on a narrow scope
of obligations covering only certain areas of human rights or other standards. The most important
instruments in the areas of labor, environment, bribery, and consumer protection are the
following:
1. ILO Regulation: Labor Standards
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the UN specialized agency that seeks to
promote and secure basic labor rights by implementing Conventions and Recommendations in
this area. The ILO has adopted hundreds of documents covering broad scope of labor standards over 180 Conventions and over 190 Recommendations had been adopted by the end of June,
2003.191 The crucial ILO instruments are the following:
a. ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 192
b. ILO Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize193
c. ILO Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively 194
d. ILO Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of
Equal Value 195
e. ILO Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 196
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See The ILO. What it is. What it does., ILO, at 15, available at
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/download/brochure/pdf/broch_0904.pdf>.
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f. ILO Convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 197
g. ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment198
h. ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour 199
i. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 200
j. Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy201
The purpose of the Tripartite Declaration is to encourage transnational corporate positive
contribution and to minimize difficulties related to the operations of TNCs.202 It formulates
principles in the areas of employment, training, conditions of work and life, and industrial
relations.203
In contrast with the above ILO instruments, the Tripartite Declaration and its
implementation process is not directed only to the member states, but also to the workers’ and
employers’ organizations, and to the TNCs themselves.204 Unfortunately, the instrument bears a
form of declaration, which means that it is not legally binding upon the contracting parties in
contrast to the previous mentioned conventions.205
196
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2. Environmental Standards
a. Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”)206
b. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 207
c. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal 208
d. Agenda 21 209
e. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 210
f. Malmö Ministerial Declaration 211
3. Bribery
a. UN

Declaration

against

Corruption

and

Bribery

in

International

Commercial

Transactions212
b. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions 213
c. The UN Convention against Corruption 214
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4. Consumer Protection
a. The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection 215
b. The OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce216
5. Conclusions
The instruments listed in this subchapter have played a crucial role in the attempts to
regulate TNCs. However, they bear some features that impede the efficient enforcement of
obligations with regard to transnational corporate conduct.
These instruments are in general of two types. The first type is an instrument that is
legally binding and imposes obligations on the contracting parties, which are always states. This
means that even though such an instrument is legally enforceable against the states parties that
have ratified it, it is not directly enforceable against TNCs. States are the ones that must ensure
transnational corporate compliance with the particular instruments, which is problematic given
the fact that TNCs often operate with more powers than the states that seek to regulate them.
The second type of the instruments described in this subchapter is even less efficient
since it is a set of recommendations, which are usually addressed to states. But even if these
recommendations are sometimes directed to TNCs, they are not legally enforceable, and
therefore, they cannot serve as major regulating instruments of transnational corporate conduct.
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D. International Instruments Covering a Broad Scope of Obligations and Regulating All
Types of Transnational Corporations
1. UN Regulation
a. UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations 217
Negotiations on the UN Draft Code began in 1977; however, the Code was never fully
adopted and in 1992 the negotiations were definitely abandoned.218 The Code sought to regulate
TNCs by applying certain standards on their conduct, as well by imposing obligations on
governments that would guarantee certain level of treatment for TNCs.219 One of the main issues
was whether the Code should have been in the form of voluntary guidelines or legally binding.220
While the developing and socialist countries preferred a legally binding code of conduct, the
OECD countries firmly insisted on a voluntary form of the document.221
If the Draft Code had been fully adopted, it would have represented a radical movement
forward in the process of regulating TNCs on international level since it would be the first
document covering a broad scope of obligations related to transnational corporate conduct and
involving such a large number of states. However, the document probably articulated higher
goals than it was possible to realize at the time of the drafting process, and therefore was doomed
to fail.
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b. The UN Global Compact 222
The Global Compact is a voluntary program between the United Nations and
corporations that was initiated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in January, 1999, and
formally established on July 26, 2000.223 Its purpose is to support corporate compliance with
certain minimum standards.224 To ensure such compliance, Global Compact offers its own
voluntary code that consists of originally nine (now ten) principles in the areas of human rights
(1st and 2nd principle), labor (3rd to 6th principle), environment (7th to 9th principle) and anticorruption (10th principle).225
Unfortunately, the Global Compact offers only vague statements without any
enforcement or monitoring procedures that would ensure corporate compliance with the
principles.226 There have been expressed concerns that “many corporations would like nothing
better than to wrap themselves in the flag of the United Nation in order to ‘bluewash’ their public
image, while at the same time avoiding significant changes to their behavior.”227 In other words,
the Global Compact provides corporations with great possibilities for covering the most critical
areas of social responsibility - human rights, environment, labor and anti-corruption standards,
while declaring these standards only symbolically without making any major changes in their
business conduct.228
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c. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms/Norms)229
The Norms currently represent the most promising international instrument regulating
transnational corporate conduct. Therefore, the instrument is discussed in more detail in the
following chapter of this comment.
2. OECD Regulation
a. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines/Guidelines)230
The OECD Guidelines play a crucial role in regulating transnational corporate conduct.
Therefore, this instrument is further discussed in the following chapter of this comment.
b. The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (the MAI) 231
The MAI was aimed to promote and protect investment by including provisions on
investment protection as well as the revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.232
The MAI also contained an independent dispute settlement mechanism, and as such covered all
essential aspects of foreign direct investment.233 It was intended to be in the form of a legally
binding document with the exception of the Guidelines, which were to keep their voluntary
character.234 However, as in the case of the UN Draft Code of Conduct on TNCs, the
negotiations on the MAI were eventually abandoned.235 The aspirations of the instrument were
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huge, and there were issues that could not be agreed on, such as the incorporation of labor and
environment provisions, both of which were strongly opposed by some states.236
3. Conclusions
The UN Norms and the OECD Guidelines are crucial instruments regulating
transnational corporate conduct. Therefore, the following chapter deals with them in more detail.
The advantage of the instruments included in this subchapter is that they cover a broad
scope of obligations aimed directly at transnational corporate conduct. However, their major
disadvantage is that they were adopted as a set of voluntary recommendations that are not legally
enforceable, and thus, do not guarantee compliance of all TNCs. Although the UN Norms go
further than the other non-binding documents in setting up implementation procedures, they still
remain on the level of soft law.
Nevertheless, these documents, especially the UN Norms and the OECD Guidelines,
prove that there is an increasing interest of international organizations and states in dealing with
the issue of ensuring transnational corporate compliance with certain established standards. The
UN Norms might serve as a model for a legally binding document in the future. However, this is
a question of further intergovernmental discussions.
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CHAPTER V
CRUCIAL UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE INSTRUMENTS
REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 237 (OECD Guidelines/Guidelines)
1. Origins and Development
The Guidelines are part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, which is aimed at promoting and protecting foreign direct
investment.238 Besides the Guidelines, the Declaration also includes the following parts:
•

Principle of national treatment for foreign-owned enterprises;

•

Co-operation among adhering governments in order to avoid conflicting requirements on
multinational enterprises;

•

Co-operation among adhering governments with regard to international investment
incentives and disincentives.239
The OECD Guidelines were adopted in 1976 and are currently supported by 39 adhering

governments consisting of all 30 OECD member countries and 9 non-member countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia).240 The
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Guidelines are non-binding recommendations addressed by adhering governments to TNCs
headquartered on their territories to ensure their compliance with laws and policies of the
countries where they operate.241
The Guidelines are part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, which is aimed at promoting and protecting foreign direct
investment.242 Besides the Guidelines, the Declaration also includes the following parts:
•

Principle of national treatment for foreign-owned enterprises;

•

Co-operation among adhering governments in order to avoid conflicting requirements on
multinational enterprises;

•

Co-operation among adhering governments with regard to international investment
incentives and disincentives.243
The Guidelines were amended in 1979, in 1984, in 1991, and in 2000.244 The 1991

amendment added a new chapter on environmental protection.245 The most significant revisions
of the Guidelines were approved on June 27, 2000 after long negotiations among member
countries and consultations with numerous NGOs.246 These revisions included an extension of
labor rights (Chapter IV) by adding abolition of child labor, elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labor, and prohibition of discrimination with regard to employment.247 Also, the
latest Guidelines revision added a direct reference to human rights in Chapter II, stating that
multinational enterprises should “[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their activities
241
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consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.”248 Further, a
paragraph referring to the business supply chain was added stating that multinational enterprises
should “[e]ncourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and subcontractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines.”249 Finally,
and most importantly, the applicability of the Guidelines was extended to extraterritorial
activities of TNCs, which are the ones performed outside their home territories.250 Therefore, the
Guidelines now cover, for example, activities of an Indian subsidiary of an American business
enterprise.251 This revision is crucial since the use of the Guidelines is especially needed in host
countries, where relevant legal norms and policies are often lacking or are ineffective when
enforcing basic human rights and other standards related to transnational corporate conduct.
2. Contents of the Guidelines
The latest version of the Guidelines covers a broad scope of transnational corporate
activities and is divided into the following chapters:
a. Concepts and Principles
The first chapter includes introductory paragraphs that state the purpose, nature and scope
of the Guidelines.252 It explains that the Guidelines are voluntary and not legally enforceable
recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises.253 This chapter also
includes a definition of a multinational enterprise and clarifies that the Guidelines are not aimed
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at distinguishing between domestic and multinational enterprises.254 Whenever it is relevant, the
Guidelines should apply to multinational as well as domestic enterprises.255 However, the
Guidelines acknowledge that small- and medium-sized enterprises do not always operate with
the same capacities as larger businesses.256
b. General Policies
The second chapter encourages enterprises to comply with policies of host countries and
to respect interests of other stakeholders.257 To reach this goal, the chapter further states general
principles that should be followed by multinational enterprises.258
c. Disclosure of Information
The third chapter encourages enterprises to disclose “timely, regular, reliable and relevant
information” regarding their activities, structure, financial situation and performance.259 The
chapter further lists what kind of basic and additional information enterprises should disclose.260
d. Employment and Industrial Relations
The fourth chapter covers numerous labor rights to be respected by enterprises with
regard to employment and industrial relations including the right of their employees to be
represented by trade unions and other bona fide representatives, abolition of child labor,
eliminations of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, prohibition of discrimination against
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their employees, providing necessary facilities and information to employee representatives,
promotion of co-operation between enterprises and employees and their representatives.261
e. Environment
Enterprises should take into account “the need to protect the environment, public health
and safety [and] to conduct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of
sustainable development.”262 To reach this goal, the Guidelines encourage enterprises to engage
in numerous activities, such as establishing and maintaining an appropriate system of
environmental management, providing the public and employees with adequate and timely
information on environment, health and safety impacts of their activities, providing adequate
education and training to employees in environmental, health and safety matters.263
f. Combating Bribery
The sixth chapter deals with the prohibition of bribery.264 In order to eliminate bribery,
enterprises should: avoid paying any portion of a contract payment to public officials or the
employees of their business partners, ensure appropriate remuneration of their agents, enhance
the transparency of their activities, promote employee knowledge of and compliance with their
anti-bribery and anti-corruption policies, adopt management control systems discouraging
bribery and corruption, and avoid illegal contributions to candidates for public office or to
political parties.265
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g. Consumer Interests
To ensure protection of consumer interests, enterprises should follow fair business,
marketing and advertising practices and should ensure the safety and quality of their products or
services.266 This chapter further includes numerous particular recommendations that should be
followed by enterprises in order to reach the general goal of protecting consumer interests, such
as meeting all agreed or legally required health and safety standards of goods or services;
providing clear and accurate information regarding content, safe use, maintenance, storage, and
disposal of products or services, etc.267
h. Science and Technology
The eighth chapter of the Guidelines includes recommendations to enterprises related to
science and technology ensuring that their business activities are compatible with policies and
plans of host countries.268
i. Competition
The ninth chapter encourages enterprises to comply with all applicable laws and
regulations related to competition.269
j. Taxation
The last chapter encourages enterprises to pay their tax liabilities in host countries.270
3. Institutional Framework
The institutional set-up for implementation procedures on the Guidelines consist of three
main elements: National Contact Points (NCPs); the OECD’s Committee on International
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Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME); and the advisory committees of business and
labor federations (Business and Industry Advisory Committee – BIAC; and Trade Union
Advisory Committee – TUAC) and NGOs (represented by OECD Watch).271
NCPs play the most important role in the implementing process. They are set up by the
adhering countries and are aimed at promoting the Guidelines and handling enquiries and
discussions of concerned parties.272 NCPs assist businesses, employee organizations, and other
concerned parties with solving issues arising under the Guidelines. When dealing with such
issues, NCPs can seek advice from relevant authorities, representatives of business community,
employee organizations, and other NGOs; consult other NCPs concerned; and seek the CIME’s
guidance with regard to the interpretation of the Guidelines.273 NCPs are required to meet and
report to the CIME every year.274
The establishment of NCPs represents a unique way of implementing an international
instrument. However, the implementation system does not have sufficient tools enabling an
effective implementation of the Guidelines. In case the parties have not agreed on a resolution of
an issue related to said implementation, NCPs do not have an obligation to make the results
public.275 The Procedural Guidance states: “After consultation with the parties involved, [NCPs
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will] make publicly available the results of these procedures unless preserving confidentiality
would be in the best interests of effective implementation of the Guidelines.”276 Thus, in the light
of “preserving confidentiality,” the only available tool to punish enterprises violating the
standards included in the Guidelines becomes ineffective.
CIME functions as the ultimate body responsible for implementation of the Guidelines.277
Its responsibilities include: issuing clarifications on the Guidelines; organizing discussions on
issues related to the Guidelines, and reporting to the OECD Council with regard to the
Guidelines.278
4. Conclusions
The Guidelines are undoubtedly a significant effort in establishing international standards
to regulate transnational corporate conduct. However, they suffer from several disadvantages.
Firstly, although the Guidelines mention in the Preface some major international instruments
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the
Agenda 21 and the Copenhagen Declaration for Social Development, they do not expressly state
that multinational enterprises are obliged to respect the principles included in these
instruments.279 Further, although the Guidelines represent recommendations addressed to
multinational enterprises, their implementation is left solely to the governments and international
bodies.280 Moreover, NCPs are not obliged to make the results of complaint procedures public,
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which substantially weakens the efficiency of the Guidelines’ implementation.281 Additionally,
the instrument, even though now applied also to business conduct outside of the territory of
OECD countries, was still adopted only by a relatively small number of wealthy countries, which
cannot be measured with the general authority of the UN Norms. Finally, the Guidelines
represent an international instrument of entirely voluntary nature, which is emphasized in the
Guidelines themselves, and therefore it can hardly serve as a guarantee of transnational corporate
compliance with international standards.282
B. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 283 (UN Norms/Norms)
On August 13, 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights (Sub-Commission) adopted the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.284 The Norms
currently represent the most significant instrument at the international level that imposes a wide
range of obligations on TNCs.
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1. Drafting History
The drafting history of the UN Norms began when the Sub-Commission in its Resolution
1998/8 of August 20, 1998,285 established a working group of the Sub-Commission consisting of
five of its members, which received a mandate for a three-year period “to examine the working
methods and activities of transnational corporations.”286 The working group considered the first
“Draft Code of Conduct for Companies” in August 2000.287 At a seminar in March 2001,
members of the working group met with representatives of NGOs, companies and unions, and
several scholars to discuss their comments on the Norms.288
After considering all received comments, the working group submitted a draft of the
Norms to be presented at the fifty-fifth session of the Sub-Commission in July-August 2003.289
Finally, during the fifty-fifth session, the working group adopted a revised version of the Norms
and the Commentary, and submitted the document to the Sub-Commission, which approved the
Norms in its Resolution 2003/16 of August 13, 2003.290 Resolution 2003/16 also transmitted the
Norms to the Commission on Human Rights for consideration, and established an initial
implementation procedure based on receiving information by the working group from all
interested parties on negative business conduct.291 Adoption of the Norms received a strong
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support from a large number of NGOs, and some of them stated their intention to use the Norms
as standards for reporting on business conduct with regard to human rights.292
2. The Scope of the Norms
One of the issues discussed during the drafting process was whether the Norms should be
directed only to TNCs or to all businesses.293 The main argument against addressing the Norms
only to TNCs was based on the fact that a defective definition of TNC would allow businesses to
hide their transnational character, and therefore, avoid applicability of the Norms on their
conduct.294 For this reason, the Norms are addressed to TNCs but also to “other business
enterprises,” and the document defines a TNC as well as “other business enterprise.”295 Thus, all
businesses, whether domestic or international, should respect and follow the Norms. However,
the implementation of the Norms concentrates on TNCs, large businesses, and firms connected
to TNCs.296
Another closely connected issue is whether to apply the Norms to all businesses in their
supply chains. The Norms state:
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“Each transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and
incorporate these Norms in their contract or other arrangement and dealings with
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other
legal persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation or
business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of the
Norms.297
The Commentary on the Norms further explains:
“Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall ensure that they
only do business with (including purchasing from and selling to) contractors,
subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, and natural or other legal persons
that follow these or substantially similar Norms. Transnational corporations and
other business enterprises using or considering entering into business
relationships with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or
natural or other legal persons that do not comply with the Norms shall initially
work with them to reform or decrease violations, but if they will not change, the
enterprise shall cease doing business with them.”298
Therefore, all businesses – regardless of their domestic or international character, size, and
position in the supply chain – should comply with the Norms.299 Moreover, business enterprises
should ensure that their contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees and distributors respect
the Norms, and in case business enterprises are not able to ensure such compliance, they are
required to end business relationships with violators of the Norms.300
Even though the Norms are applicable to all businesses without differentiating among
them, the document does make a difference with regard to their responsibilities under the Norms
according to the degree of influence they have on markets, governments, stakeholders, and
communities.301 The Norms provide:
“Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure
the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized
297
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in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of
indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”302
The Norms presume that larger businesses and TNCs, in comparison with smaller
businesses, operate with more powers and engage in wider areas of activities, which bring them
larger amount of influence.303 Thus, in this way, the Norms ensure that businesses with larger
influence have adequate responsibilities in protecting human rights.
3. The Preamble of the Norms
The Norms consist of a preamble followed by eight sections and definitions of major
terms.304 The preamble of the Norms specifically refers to major UN documents.305 It also refers
to other essential international documents, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.306
Direct reference to the most crucial international human rights instruments is one of the
most significant features of the Norms.307 By doing this, the Norms gain more respect that is
related to the high authority of the international instruments mentioned in the preamble of the
Norms.308
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4. Human Rights Obligations Included in the Norms
a. General Obligations
The first paragraph of the Norms clarifies general obligations of states, TNCs and other
business enterprises in promoting and securing human rights.309 This paragraph establishes a
general rule that is applicable to all other sections and should be kept in mind when reading other
sections of the instrument.310 Primary responsibility to promote and secure human rights is left
upon states, including their responsibility to ensure that TNCs and other business enterprises
respect human rights.311 By emphasizing primary state responsibility in the area of human rights,
the Norms send a clear message to governments: they cannot use the Norms to justify their
failures in protecting human rights.312 This is also supported by paragraph 19 of the Norms
(savings clause), which provides that nothing in the Norms shall be construed to diminish,
restrict or adversely affect human rights obligations of states or more protective human rights
norms.313
TNCs and other business enterprises are responsible for promoting and respecting human
rights within their respective spheres of activity and influence.314 As explained above, this means
that enterprises with larger influence should also have larger responsibilities.
b. Right to Equal Opportunity and Non-discriminatory Treatment
The second section of the Norms deals with the right to equal opportunity and nondiscriminatory treatment, which is one of the most crucial workers’ rights.315 Prohibited reasons
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for discrimination include race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social
origin, social status, indigenous status, disability, age, health status (including HIV/AIDS,
disability), marital status, capacity to bear children, pregnancy and sexual orientation.316
However, greater protection of children does not constitute discrimination.317
Additionally, the Commentary on the Norms defines discrimination as “any distinction,
exclusion, or preference made on the above-stated bases, which has the effect of nullifying or
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.”318
c. Right to Security of Persons
The third section deals with international crimes against human beings.319 Businesses
shall not engage in nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
forced disappearance, force or compulsory labor, hostage-taking, extra-judicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, nor other violations of humanitarian law and other international crimes
against the human person.320 Some readers might believe that this paragraph does not need to be
included in the Norms.321 However, this paragraph has proved to be necessary as a result of past
experiences.322 One of the most representative examples is the Zyclon B Gas Case, where the
provider of the gas that was used to kill concentration camp prisoners was convicted for
complicity in international crimes.323
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The third section of the Norms also deals with business security arrangements.324 Such
arrangements shall observe international human rights norms and laws of the countries in which
the companies operate, and “shall be used only for preventive and defensive services.”325
Security personnel are prohibited to use force except when “strictly necessary” and the force
used in such a case must be proportional to the threat.326 Security personnel shall not violate
workers rights, such as freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and the right to engage in
collective bargaining.327 Moreover, companies shall avoid hiring private militias and paramilitary
groups, or working with units of state security forces known for human rights or humanitarian
law violations.328
d. Rights of Workers
The fourth section formulates the following rights of workers: prohibition of forced or
compulsory labor; prohibition of economic exploitation of children; the right to a safe and
healthy working environment; remuneration ensuring adequate living for workers and their
families; freedom of association; the right to collective bargaining; and finally, the right to
establish and join organizations of the worker’s own choosing.329 The Commentary on the
Norms further refers to relevant international instruments, mostly to ILO conventions.330
The problematic issue with these provisions is that they are established in such a broad
and all-embracing manner that allows companies to avoid their fulfillment.331 For example, the
expressions “fair and reasonable remuneration” and “adequate standard of living” leave space for
324
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companies to adopt their own interpretation of the terms, which might result in insufficient
protection of workers’ rights.332 However, an exact interpretation of these terms is not always
easy, since the living conditions and the level of wages significantly varies in each country, and
it would be unrealistic to suggest a unified level of wages for all countries.333
e. Respect for National Sovereignty and Human Rights
The fifth section, entitled ‘Respect for National Sovereignty and Human Rights’,
addresses a wide scope of rights regarding the relationship between TNCs and host
governments.334 By including this section, the Norms take a modern approach towards the social
role of TNCs.335 TNCs are not anymore required to respect only political and civil rights, but
also social, economic and cultural rights, including the rights to development, adequate food and
drinking water, the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, adequate housing,
privacy, education, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and freedom of opinion and
expression.336 Additionally, this section also includes prohibition of bribery.337
Even though the Norms shall be given credit for including those rights, it is not clear how
to exercise them in reality.338 The rights are described in very broad terms without any
specification on the manner in which they should be brought into practice.339
f. Consumer Protection
The sixth section of the Norms deals with obligations related to consumer protection,
which include the obligation of companies to act in accordance with fair business, marketing and
332
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advertising practices; the obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and quality of
the goods and services they provide, including observance of the precautionary principle; and the
prohibition of producing, distributing, marketing, or advertising harmful or potentially harmful
products for use by consumers.340
Moreover, the Commentary on the Norms refers to existing relevant international
instruments on consumer protection to be observed by businesses.341 The Commentary also
provides that in cases where a product is potentially harmful to the consumer, companies are
required to disclose all appropriate information on the contents and possible hazardous effects of
the products they produce, which can be done through proper labeling, informative and accurate
advertising.342
g. Environmental Protection
The seventh section of the Norms addresses obligations of TNCs and other business
enterprises with regard to environmental protection.343 Companies are required to observe
national as well as international law related to preservation of environment, human rights, public
health and safety, bioethics, and the precautionary principle.344 Moreover, business conduct of
companies shall be performed in accordance with the wider goal of sustainable development.345
Since environmental laws of host countries do not always prove very effective and often
consist of very low environmental standards, it is crucial that the Norms require businesses to
respect international agreements and standards.346 However, the vague formulation of
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environmental international standards does not seem to provide enough environmental protection
either.347
5. Implementation Provisions
The Norms deal with their implementation in section eight. They provide with
implementation procedures on several levels, starting from implementation by business
enterprises themselves, and then moving on implementation by intergovernmental organizations,
states, unions, and others.348
Businesses are required to adopt internal codes of conduct reflecting the content of the
Norms and to ensure that these codes are disseminated.349 They are also required to report
periodically on which measures were taken to implement the Norms.350 As previously
mentioned, businesses are also required to apply the Norms and ensure their implementation in
their supply chains.351 Additionally, businesses shall perform periodic evaluations analyzing the
impact of their own activities on human rights under the Norms.352 Moreover, companies shall
ensure that workers are provided with legitimate and confidential means to file complaints with
regard to violations of the Norms.353 Finally, in case of their non-compliance with the Norms,
business enterprises shall ensure that adversely affected persons, entities and communities are
provided with adequate reparation.354
The UN and other international and national mechanisms shall perform periodic,
transparent and independent monitoring of business enterprises to ensure their application of the
347
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Norms.355 The Commentary provides a few suggestions on how the UN could participate in the
implementation procedure.356 To ensure implementation of the Norms, UN human rights bodies
could create additional reporting requirements for states.357 The Norms could also be used as the
basis for procurement requirements for the UN and its agencies.358 Country reporters and
thematic procedures of the Commission on Human Rights could use the Norms when raising
concerns about actions by business enterprises within their respective mandates.359
The Commentary on the Norms also encourages trade unions to use the Norms as a basis
for negotiating agreements with companies and monitoring compliance with them.360 NGOs are
encouraged to use the Norms as the basis for their expectations of business conduct and for
monitoring the compliance of businesses with the Norms.361 Industry groups shall also use the
Norms for their monitoring.362
Finally, the Norms call upon governments to use the Norms as a model for legislation or
administrative provisions related to businesses conduct within their respective territories.363
6. Conclusions
In comparison to other international instruments seeking to regulate TNCs, the Norms
have several advantages. First, they directly refer to major international human rights instruments
in their text.364 The instrument also covers all crucial areas related to corporate conduct,
including human and labor rights; prohibition of international crimes; social, cultural and
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economic rights; relationship between business enterprises and host states; consumer and
environmental protection. The Norms are addressed directly to business enterprises and impose
obligations on them, which is in sharp contrast with most international documents that impose
obligations primarily on governments.365 Also, as mentioned before, the Norms address all
business enterprises and not only TNCs.
Most importantly, although the Norms were not adopted as a treaty, the numerous
implementation provisions of the Norms demonstrate that the goals of the Norms reach further
than a typical voluntary code of conduct.366 Also, the Norms use the term “shall” instead of the
traditional “should”, which is a clear sign that the Norms intend to play more important role than
typical soft law instruments.367 This is one of the main advantages of the Norms in comparison
with other international instruments aimed at corporate conduct.
The Norms certainly represent a radical step towards imposing obligatory standards on
transnational corporate conduct. However, the Norms still lack enough details concerning the
implementation mechanism.368 Although the Commentary on the Norms includes some
suggestions dealing with this issue, it is still not specific enough in indicating exactly how to
ensure compliance with the Norms and reparation in case of business’ non-compliance.369 Most
importantly, since the Norms are not in a form of a treaty, they are not legally enforceable as the
other existing international instruments addressed to TNCs. Therefore, it is too soon to make any
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conclusion on the efficiency of the Norms since it will depend on how successfully the
implementation mechanism is developed.370
C. Conclusions: Comparison of the OECD Guidelines and the UN Norms
The UN Norms have numerous advantages in comparison to the OECD Guidelines:
•

Although the last Guidelines revision added a paragraph referring to the business supply
chain, it is definitely a weaker provision than the one included in the UN Norms.371

•

Unlike the Guidelines, the UN Norms directly refer to obligations under other human rights
international instruments.372

•

The Guidelines do not sufficiently emphasize the protection of human rights since they only
include one paragraph on this regard.373

•

The Guidelines (unlike the UN Norms) do not include any means of implementation by
TNCs themselves.

•

The UN Norms do not emphasize their voluntary nature as much as the OECD Guidelines.374

•

The OECD Guidelines were accepted by a relatively small number of “wealthy” countries in
comparison to the global authority of the UN and its Norms.
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As to the coverage of transnational corporate obligations, both instruments include a wide
range of human rights and other standards. However, neither of the instruments includes
sanctions, such as imposing fines on TNCs, which would be enforceable in case TNCs violate
the standards included in the Guidelines or the UN Norms. This is related to the fact that neither
of the instruments was adopted in the form of a legally binding treaty that would enable states to
impose such sanctions on TNCs.
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CONCLUSIONS
TNCs have benefited greatly from the globalization process; in fact, they are the entity
that is benefiting from this process the most. TNCs have gained broad protections of their rights
and huge economic power. On the other hand, they are still not subject to any obligations that
would balance their rights and make sure their powers are not being abused.
It is important to note that globalization could be useful for everyone, including workers
and consumers, and not only for TNCs. It is a process that appears to be a necessary part of
social progress and foreign direct investment is an essential element of it. The advantages are
obvious - TNCs bring capital, employment and foreign technology (know-how).375 However, it
also depends on the particular TNC to what extent these advantages are expanded since such a
TNC might not be willing to hire local residents and instead will bring its own employees; the
company might not want to share its know-how; and moreover it might tend to only gain its own
profits instead of supporting economic development of the host country.376
The solution is not to stop or fight against globalization but to make sure that the
advantages are expanded and the disadvantages are reduced. To reach such a result, it is
particularly important to hold TNCs liable for their violations of international standards and
national legal regulations. That can be realized only by imposing binding norms on transnational
corporate conduct. As discussed throughout this comment, such binding regulation should be
created at the international level since single states are not capable of regulating TNCs that
operate in many countries. Without such international regulation, TNCs can successfully avoid
375
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state legal systems and continue in violations of human rights and other standards without being
sanctioned for it.
The international regulation would ensure that the same standards and obligations are
imposed on TNCs all over the world. Thus, states accepting such international norms would not
have to be concerned that the TNCs that they are hosting will be in a comparative disadvantage
against others.377 As described above, there are already some important international instruments
seeking to regulate TNCs. However, they have many disadvantages. The instruments that bear a
binding character impose obligations only on states and cover only certain specific fields of
transnational corporate conduct. On the other hand, the instruments that could essentially
contribute to efficient international regulation of TNCs, because of being directed to TNCs and
containing a wide coverage of standards, are non-binding, and thus, not legally enforceable. The
latter group of instruments also includes the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and
the UN Norms, which are currently the most important instruments regulating transnational
corporate conduct at the international level.
Therefore, to efficiently regulate TNCs the following improvements will be needed. First
of all, a political consensus among the majority of states supporting a binding treaty regulating
TNCs needs to be achieved. Such a treaty should be created under the authority of the UN since
this will ensure its global nature. The provisions contained in the treaty should bind states that
would be obliged to ensure transnational corporate compliance with the respective instrument by
creating an effective enforcement mechanism at the national level and imposing sanctions on
TNCs. Such sanctions could include imposing higher taxes and tariffs on TNCs violating the
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treaty, as well as making their violations public.378 On the contrary, TNCs that would be in
compliance with the standards included in the treaty could be encouraged by economic
incentives, such as tariff reductions, tax breaks, and public recognition.379 The treaty should
contain all the areas and standards already agreed on, including human rights, labor standards,
consumer protection, environmental protection, prohibition of corruption and respect for national
sovereignty. Also, to ensure its efficiency, the document must have clear and effective
enforcement provisions that should include regulation by an international body as well as
regulation at the national level. The international body should consist of representatives of the
states, NGOs and other interest organizations, and professional lawyers. It should perform
regular, independent and transparent monitoring of TNCs, including their supply chains. In a
case of transnational corporate non-compliance with the agreed binding rules, the international
body should be entitled to impose certain sanctions on TNCs, including the right to make
information about their non-compliance public and to impose penalties on them.
It appears that the most difficult problem to overcome before such a treaty is accepted is
to persuade states to agree on this. The developed nations might not agree because they benefit
financially from the current situation; and the less developed nations might see such a treaty as
an intervention into their sovereignty. However, if states were able to overcome their fear of such
binding international regulation, in the end, they would all benefit from it. Ethical business
conduct would raise production efficiency and satisfaction of employees.380 More effective
production would contribute to economic development, which would subsequently bring
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enjoyment of civil and political rights and expansion of democratic regimes worldwide.381 That
would further contribute to political and economic stability on global level, and thus to trade and
investment.382
Despite the fact that states and TNCs do not always realize that moral business conduct
can be also highly profitable, it seems that it is only a matter of time when political consensus is
reached and binding international norms are established. The acceptance of The UN Norms is a
great and promising step forward that indicates fast evolution in this field and also means that
states are becoming conscious about the importance of this issue.
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